The Demise of the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention--An Unnecessary Fatality: Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. by Vianale, Kenneth J.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 57 
Number 3 Volume 57, Spring 1983, Number 3 Article 6 
July 2012 
The Demise of the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw 
Convention--An Unnecessary Fatality: Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. 
Kenneth J. Vianale 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Vianale, Kenneth J. (1983) "The Demise of the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention--An 
Unnecessary Fatality: Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 57 : No. 
3 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol57/iss3/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE DEMISE OF THE LIABI[LITY
LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION-AN UNNECESSARY
FATALITY: FRANKLIN MINT CORP. V.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
The paramount purpose of the Warsaw Convention (the Con-
vention)1 was to foster the development of a nascent aviation in-
dustry by limiting the extent of an airline's liability for accidents
occurring during the course of an international flight.2 Expressing
I Warsaw Convention, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876,
137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
2 Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977);
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 497, 499 (1967); see Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 327 (5th
Cir. 1967). The expressed purposes of the Warsaw Convention were to create uniformity in
air carriers' liability as well as to provide for consistency in air transport documentation.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, preamble, 49 Stat. 3014, T.S. No. 876, at 16, 137 L.N.T.S.
15; see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra, at 498-99. The liability limitation was considered
the more important of the two purposes since without limited liability, insurance costs
would be prohibitive and the newborn aviation industry would be unable to attract inves-
tors. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra, at 499-500.
The Convention was enacted in 1929, id. at 498, although the United States did not
declare its adherence until 1934, Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11. The Convention applies only to international commercial air transpor-
tation of persons, baggage or cargo. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1), 49 Stat.
3014, T.S. No. 876, at 17, 137 L.N.T.S. 15. "International transportation" refers to a flight
that, according to the contract of carriage, is between two member states or a flight within
one member state "if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory ... of another
power, even though that power is not a party to [the Warsaw] convention." Id. art. 1(2), 49
Stat. 3014, T.S. No. 876, at 16-17, 137 L.N.T.S. 15; see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra, at
501. There is a presumption of liability against the air carrier in the case of personal injuries
or death, Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018, T.S. No. 876, at 21, 137
L.N.T.S. 23, which is rebutted: (1) upon proof that the carrier took "all necessary measures
to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for [it] to take such measures," id. art. 20(1),
49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 22, 137 L.N.T.S. 25, and (2) to the extent that a particular
jurisdiction recognizes the affirmative defense of contributory negligence by the passenger,
id. art. 21, 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 22, 137 L.N.T.S. 25. An airline will be relieved of
liability for loss of baggage or cargo if it can prove that the "damage was occasioned by an
error in piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in the navigation and that, in all other
respects, [the airline has] taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage." Id. art. 20(2),
49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 22, 137 L.N.T.S. 25. An airline will not be accorded the
Convention's limitations of liability if the airline or its agent is guilty of wilful misconduct.
Id. art. 25(1), 49 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876, at 23, 137 L.N.T.S. 27. The ceiling limit of a
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the maximum recoverable amount in terms of a specified number
of Poincar6 francs,3 the member nations sought to create a uniform
limitation on liability, the gold value of which could be readily con-
passenger's recovery is limited to 125,000 gold francs for personal injuries or death and 250
francs per kilogram of damaged or lost goods. Id. art. 22(1), (2), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876,
at 22, 137 L.N.T.S. 25. The sums can be converted into the passenger's domestic currency.
Id. art. 22(4), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 22, 137 L.N.T.S. 25; see infra notes 3-4. Addi-
tionally, provisions that would fix a lower limit of liability or relieve the carrier of liability
entirely are declared by the Convention to be void. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art.
23, 49 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876, at 22, 137 L.N.T.S. 27. There is a 2-year statute of limita-
tions governing actions against airlines, which begins to run from the date of arrival at the
point of destination, or from the purported date of arrival, or from the date transportation
ceased. Id. art. 29, 49 Stat. 3021, T.S. No. 876, at 23, 137 L.N.T.S. 29.
s Article 22 of the Convention provides in part:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each
passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. . . . Nevertheless, by spe-
cial contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the
carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor
has made, at the time when the package was handed over to the carrier, a special
declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case
so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the
declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the actual value to
the consignor at delivery.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc
consisting of 651/2 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred
thousandths. These sums may be converted into any national currency in round
figures.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(1), (2), (4), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 22, 137
L.N.T.S. 25.
Article 22 refers to the French gold franc, or "Poincar6" franc, named after the French
prime minister under whose administration the gold value of the franc was set at 651/2 milli-
grams of gold at the standard of millesimal fineness of 900. Asser, Golden Limitations of
Liability in International Transport Conventions and the Currency Crisis, 5 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 645, 645 (1974). The Poincar6 franc was in existence only from 1928 to 1936. See A.
LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW § 6.5, at 7-168 (1981).
At the time the Convention was enacted in 1929, national currencies were easily con-
verted to gold because gold possessed an official rate of exchange. Civil Aeronautics Board
Internal Memorandum, Warsaw Convention Liability Limits 3 (May 20, 1981) [hereinafter
cited as CAB Memorandum, May 20, 1981]; see infra note 4. Gold was used as the referent
of maximum liability, rather than any particular national currency, in order to avoid any
fluctuations in value caused by unilateral government action. See Boehringer Mannheim
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 344, 350 (S.D. Tex. 1981);
Civil Aeronautics Board Internal Memorandum, Warsaw Convention Liability Limits 6
(Mar. 18, 1980) [hereinafter cited as CAB Memorandum, Mar. 18, 1980]; H. DRION, LIMrrA-
TION OF LABmrLnms IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 183 (1954); Asser, supra, at 664; Heller, The
Value of the Gold Franc-A Different Point of View, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 73, 91 (1974).
Linking an airline's limits on liability to a uniform standard effectuated the Convention's
overall purpose of protecting the infant aviation industry. See generally supra note 2.
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verted into any national currency.4 For more than 40 years, the
conversion of judgments based upon the official price of gold posed
no serious problems for the Convention's member States.5 Confu-
sion ensued, however, in 1978, when, by international agreement,'
' Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(4), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 22, 137
L.N.T.S. 25. Under article 22(2) of the Convention, a plaintiff would be limited to 250 gold
francs per kilogram of lost or damaged goods. If, for example, a plaintiff brought suit under
the Convention for damage to cargo, his recovery in United States currency would be lim-
ited to the dollar value of 65/2 milligrams of gold multiplied by 250 for each kilogram (2.2
lbs.) of cargo damaged.
5 Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc., v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 531 F.
Supp. 344, 350 (S.D. Tex. 1981); H. DRION, supra note 3, at 183; Asser, supra note 3, at 664;
Heller, supra note 3, at 95. When the Convention was enacted in 1929, the value of gold was
approximately $20 per ounce. 531 F. Supp. at 350. In 1934, when the United States ratified
the Convention, see supra note 3, the dollar was devalued to an official price of $35 an
ounce. See Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-87, § 2, 48 Stat. 337 (1934) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 467 (1976)). This official United States gold value served as an official currency
for international transactions due to the comparative financial strength of the United
States. R. CARBAUGH & L. FAN, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 63-64 (1976). In
1945, the United States became a party to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bretton
Woods Agreements Act, ch. 339, § 2, 59 Stat. 512 (1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1976)),
which created an international currency exchange that was based on assigned par values for
each nation's currency, Heller, supra note 3, at 79-80. Each member of the IMF was to
express the par value of its currency in terms of gold or in terms of the United States dollar.
R. SOLOMON, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: 1945-1976 12 (1977); Gold, Gold in
International Monetary Law: Change, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity, 15 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
323, 326-27 (1981); Heller, supra note 3, at 79-80. The United States, according to the Bret-
ton Woods Agreements Act, promised to maintain the par value of the dollar at .888671
grams of fine gold. Gold, supra, at 326. Under this international monetary system, therefore,
the establishment of gold as an international common denominator "resulted in a precise
relationship, called parity, between each two currencies and a consistent network of parities
among all currencies." Id. at 327. Since the IMF was composed of some 45 countries in 1944,
Heller, supra note 3, at 79, translation of judgments into domestic currencies based on the
Convention's "gold clause" (article 22(4)) was not problematical, see Boehringer, 531 F.
Supp. at 350. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, § 6.5, at 7-168 to -69. An official price of gold
existed internationally for approximately 40 years, Boehringer, 531 F. Supp. at 351, until
the IMF abandoned the requirement that gold be kept at a uniform value, see infra notes 6-
7 and accompanying text.
' Bretton Woods Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S.
39 (1945) (amended 1969, 1978); see Boehringer, 531 F. Supp. at 351; Asser, supra note 3, at
651. The United States dollar suffered a series of devaluations during the 1970's due to
immense deficits. Asser, supra note 3, at 651. In 1971, President Nixon suspended the
United States obligation under the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to convert gold into
dollars. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, § 6.5, at 7-169. The dollar was devalued in 1971 to $38
per ounce, Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268, § 2, 86 Stat. 116 (1972), and
again in 1973 to $42.22 per ounce, Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 93-110, § 1, 87
Stat. 352 (1973), repealed by Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2660
(1976). In response to the dollar's devaluations, the IMF enacted amendments to the Bret-
ton Woods Agreements Act. First, the Special Drawing Right (SDR) was established to re-
place the dollar as the IMF's standard of account. Amendment of Articles of Agreement of
the International Monetary Fund, July 28, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726
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the official gold price was eliminated in favor of the fluctuating free
market price. Since that time, courts have been confronted with
the question whether the last official price of gold or its fluctuating
free market price1 should serve as the basis of conversion under
the Convention.8 Compounding this confusion was the suggestion
from several spheres that the judiciary adopt a limitation based
upon a unit of account other than the Poincar6 franc." Recently, in
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,10 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the elimination of the
U.N.T.S. 266. The SDR's value was set at .888671 gram of fine gold. Id. art. XXI, § 2, 20
U.S.T. 2781, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726 U.N.T.S. 280; see Gold, supra note 5, at 344-47. A sec-
ond IMF amendment to the Bretton Woods Agreements Act came in 1976, and eliminated
the obligation of IMF members to use gold as a common denominator for currency values,
and also eliminated gold as the basis of the SDR. Second Amendment to the International
Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement, April 30, 1976, art. VIII, § 7, art. XXII, 29 U.S.T.
2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937; see Gold, supra note 5, at 351-53. The United States ratified the
IMF's second amendment and repealed the Par Value Modification Act of 1973, which had
set the official value of gold at $42.22 per ounce. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90
Stat. 2660. Thus, after April 1, 1978, with the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act of
1973, there no longer existed any fixed relationship between gold and the dollar. See CAB
Memorandum, March 18, 1980, supra note 3, at 3. The SDR, no longer tied to gold, was
based on a basket of 16 currencies which, in turn, was reduced to five currencies in 1981.
See Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clarification, 13 J. MAR. L.
& CoM. 1, 3 (1981).
7 With the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act, which itself had become effective
April 1, 1978, the price of gold, having no official value, was subject to the vacillations of the
open market. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, § 6.5, at 7-169; Asser, supra note 3, at.646;
Heller, supra note 3, at 103.
8 Compare Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
531 F. Supp. 344, 349 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (current free market price of gold employed by court
as standard of conversion) with In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp.
833, 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (last official price of gold selected as unit of conversion).
' See In re Air Crash Disaster, 535 F. Supp. at 839-41 (defendant aircraft owner advo-
cating use of the SDR or the current French franc as the basic unit of account); Martin, The
Price of Gold and the Warsaw Convention III, 6 AIR LAW 246, 249 (1981) (advocating adop-
tion of the SDR). It is necessary at this point to outline the differences between a unit of
conversion and a standard of liability limitation. Although each represents a distinct con-
cept, these terms often are used interchangeably. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 535 F.
Supp. 833, 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The last official price of gold and the free market price of
gold are units of conversion. They each serve the function of converting Poincar6 francs into
different national currencies. As such, they are used in conjunction with the existing stan-
dard of liability under the Convention. See supra note 3. On the other hand, the French
paper franc and the SDR are separate units of account, similar in this respect to the Poin-
car6 franc, which are designed to form the basis of a standard of limitation that would
replace the Poincar6 standard embodied in the Convention. See infra notes 89-93. Accord-
ingly, neither the French franc nor the SDR can be used to convert Poincar6 francs into
other national currencies. Rather, each is to be incorporated into its own standard of liabil-
ity limitation, in lieu of the Poincar6 standard.
10 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982).
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official price of gold rendered the Convention's limitation on liabil-
ity for cargo loss or damage prospectively unenforceable in federal
courts," and concluded that it was beyond the scope of judicial
authority to select an alternative unit of conversion. 12
In Franklin Mint, the plaintiffs"3 filed suit in federal district
court against Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) after valuable
coins, to be transported by TWA from Philadelphia to London,14
were either lost or destroyed. 5 Assessing its damages at $250,000,
Franklin argued that the limitation on liability contained in article
22 of the Convention should be calculated in United States dollars
by reference to the present free market price of gold.' TWA con-
ceded liability under the terms of the Convention, but contended
that its liability under article 22 should be converted into domestic
currency by employing any one of three standards: the last official
price of gold in the United States, the present 'exchange value of
the French franc, or the Special Drawing Right (SDR) used by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).18 Deeming TWA's argument
for adopting the SDR standard "most persuasive,"' 9 the district
court nevertheless concluded that the weight of authority dictated
employment of the last official price of gold as the appropriate unit
of conversion.2- The court reasoned that the Civil Aeronautics
Board's (CAB) selection of the last official price of gold as the ap-
1" Id. at 304.
'2 See id. at 311.
" The plaintiffs included Franklin Mint Corporation, Franklin Mint, Ltd., and McGre-
gor, Swire Air Services Ltd. Id. at 304.
" Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1288 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), afi'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982). The TWA flight at issue in Franklin Mint, from
Philadelphia to London, was governed by the Convention because it involved "international
transportation" within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. See supra note 2.
1" 690 F.2d at 304. The court did not ascertain whether the goods were lost or actually
destroyed. Id. Under the Convention, however, such a determination is unnecessary since
liability is imposed for loss, damage or destruction of cargo. See Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1, art. 18(1), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 21, 137 L.N.T.S. 23; supra note 2.
16 525 F. Supp. at 1289. No special declaration of the value of the goods was made by
Franklin at the time of delivery. Id. at 1288. If Franklin had made such a declaration,
TWA's liability would have been limited, pursuant to the Convention, to the specified
amount, unless it could prove that the declared value of the goods was greater than the
actual value of the goods to Franklin. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(2), 49
Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 22, 137 L.N.T.S. 25.
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plicable standard,2 coupled with domestic carriers' use of that
standard to determine the dollar value of liability printed on their
tariffs,22 manifested the parties' intention to adopt the last official
price of gold as the proper unit of conversion.2"
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, but held that all
causes of action arising 60 days after the Franklin Mint decision
would no longer be subject to the ceiling of liability imposed by
article 22 of the Convention.24 This conclusion was premised upon
the court's belief that "devastating argument[s]" militated against
each of the four standards of liability limitation proposed by the
litigants. 25 The court reasoned that the use of the last official price
of gold would be illogical since this value had been repealed by a
specific act of Congress. 28 Furthermore, both the free market price
of gold and the current value of the French franc are inappropriate
units of conversion, according to the court, because their fluctuat-
21 Id.; see CAB Memorandum, May 20, 1981, supra note 3, at 6; infra note 72 and
accompanying text.
2 525 F. Supp. at 1289. Tariffs are public documents that set forth the carrier's services
and the regulations and practices relating to those services. See International Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 433 F. Supp. 352, 357 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 550
F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1977).
23 525 F. Supp. at 1289. Presumably, the district court was referring to the CAB and all
domestic carriers when it stated that "the parties intended to adopt the last official price of
gold as the basis for converting the article 22 limitation into dollars ... ." Id. The court
did not explain, however, why any weight should be accorded the practices of domestic car-
riers. It is suggested that the standard of conversion used by air carriers to compute their
own liability in terms of a particular national currency is irrelevant to a judicial determina-
tion since the carriers were not signatories to the Warsaw Convention. The practices of sig-
natories to a treaty, however, may be considered by a court as an aid to interpreting the
treaty at issue. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. Reliance on the CAB's adher-
ence to the last official price of gold was justifiable in that CAB statements represent gov-
ernmental opinion. But see Martin, supra note 9, at 248 (CAB opinions are not authorita-
tive and should be disregarded by courts dealing with the article 22 gold clause).
' 690 F.2d at 311-12. The court enforced the article 22 limitation on liability in this
case because the decision to decline enforceability was "not clearly foreshadowed." Id. at
312 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971)). The court relied on Chev-
ron Oil, wherein the Supreme Court asserted that a court could consider, as a factor in
deciding to apply its decision prospectively only, whether a new principle of law was estab-
lished by resolution of an issue that was not clearly foreshadowed. Id. at 106. Since this was
the first case in which a court held the Convention's liability limitation provision unenforce-
able, the result reached was not anticipated by either party to the action. 690 F.2d at 312;
cf. In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833, 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (last
official price of gold chosen as appropriate standard); Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 344, 349 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (free market
price of gold proper referent for conversion purposes).
25 690 F.2d at 306.
26 Id.; see Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2660.
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ing values undermined the Convention's purpose of assuring uni-
form judgments throughout the member nations. Finally, while
acknowledging the desirability of the highly stable SDR, the court
declined to adopt this standard because its use neither is author-
ized by nor could in any way be based upon the terms of the
Convention.28
Additionally, Judge Winter concluded that selection of a new
unit of conversion is essentially a political question,2 the answer to
which must be negotiated by the parties to the Convention. The
court noted that while treaty interpretation is within the subject-
matter jurisdiction of federal courts,3' the judiciary must be careful
not to exceed its authority by engaging in treaty proposal, negotia-
tion and ratification, which are exclusively within the province of
the executive and legislative branches of government.32 Accord-
ingly, the Second Circuit panel declined to adopt any standard of
conversion and held that the article 22 limitation on liability for
loss of cargo is prospectively unenforceable in United States
courts. 33
27 690 F.2d at 310; see infra note 83 and accompanying text.
28 690 F.2d at 310.
29 Id. at 311. Political questions, broadly speaking, involve matters that should more
properly be left to other branches of government and, thus, are essentially nonjusticiable.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONA LAW § 3-16, at 72 (1978). The political question
doctrine is based primarily on the separation of powers within the federal government, and
is considered an aspect of judicial self-restraint. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); see
Comment, Whether the President May Terminate a Mutual Defense Treaty Without Con-
gressional Approval Under the Constitution Is a Non-Justiciable Political Question
-Goldwater v. Carter, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 659, 662 (1980); infra note 50 and accompanying
text.
30 690 F.2d at 311.
31 Id. A valid treaty, one that does not conflict with the federal Constitution, is the
supreme law of the land, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635,
657 (1853); American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 152-53 (9th Cir. 1957); Oregon-
Pacific Forest Prod. Corp. v. Welsh Panel Co., 248 F. Supp. 903, 910 (D. Or. 1965), and is
subject to judicial review much like any other law, see U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, c. 2;
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 520 (1858).
3'2 690 F.2d at 311. Treaty proposal and negotiation are exclusive functions of the exec-
utive branch, U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cI. 2, while ratification of a treaty can only be accom-
plished with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, id.; see Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 32, 35 (1869).
32 690 F.2d at 311. The court held that the limitation provision of the Convention, arti-
cle 22, was unenforceable in toto. Id. at 304, 306; see supra text accompanying notes 11 &
24. The limitation clause of the Convention applies to passenger injury or death, see War-
saw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(1), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 22, 137 L.N.T.S. 25,
as well as to loss of or damage to goods and baggage, see id., art. 22(2), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S.
No. 876, at 22, 137 L.N.T.S. 25; infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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The Franklin Mint decision marks the first time that a court
has refused to enforce the Convention's limitation on liability,3 4
and, in so refusing, the Second Circuit arguably has modified a
treaty that the United States obligated itself to honor.3 5 It is sug-
gested that this modification, ironically, represents an unwarranted
intrusion upon Congress' plenary power to modify or abrogate the
United States' commitment to an international agreement.3 This
Comment examines the potentially far-reaching implications of the
Franklin Mint decision and suggests that the Second Circuit could
have employed traditional principles of treaty interpretation in or-
der to select an appropriate unit of account. Finally, the Comment
advocates judicial adoption of the SDR as a viable solution to the
Convention's "gold problem."
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF Franklin Mint
On its face, the Franklin Mint holding affects the ceiling of
liability for damage to or loss or destruction of baggage or cargo.37
It is submitted, however, that the Second Circuit's decision implic-
itly removes the ceiling of liability for personal injury and wrongful
death actions as well, since the maximum amount recoverable both
for cargo loss and for personal injuries is tied to the Poincar6
It is suggested that the court's rationale more closely resembles a proclamation that the
intent of the framers has been frustrated due to the demonetization of gold, as opposed to
any argument based upon the political question doctrine. Under the principle of clausula
rebus sic stantibus, a doctrine closely related to the common-law contract principle of frus-
tration of purpose, see A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 688 n.1 (1961), a party may sus-
pend or terminate its treaty obligations when circumstances forming the basis of its consent
to the treaty no longer exist, see Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the
Law of Treaties, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 657, 1096 (1935) (supplemental edition) [hereinafter
cited as Harvard Draft Convention]. It appears that the court views the lack of an official
price of gold as a fundamental change of circumstances that has frustrated the purpose of
the Convention. See 690 F.2d at 311 ("It is ... clear that neither international nor domes-
tic sources of law specify a unit of account for purposes of the Convention .... An essential
ingredient of... [the] formula [for conversion of judgments] has, as a consequence of inter-
national action followed by domestic legislation, ceased to exist"). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the only party who has standing to invoke the argument of clausula rebus sic
stantibus in an international court of justice is one of the signatories to the treaty in ques-
tion. Harvard Draft Convention, supra, at 1096; see Civil Aeronautics Board, Internal Mem-
orandum, Warsaw Convention Liability Limits, Apr. 18, 1980, at 4 [hereinafter cited as CAB
Memorandum, Apr. 18, 1980]. See generally 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1523-27 (1947).
3 690 F.2d at 312.
3 Id. at 304.
11 See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
37 690 F.2d at 311.
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franc.38 Thus, air carriers of the signatory nations seemingly will be
subject to unlimited liability in personal injury and wrongful death
cases arising out of an airline accident."
The apparent removal of the limitation on personal injury re-
covery, it is suggested further, will significantly impact upon the
Montreal Agreement,40 which sets a $75,000 limit on an air car-
rier's liability for personal injury or death resulting from a journey
to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in the United States.4'
Article 23 of the Convention states that "[a]ny provision tending
to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that
which is laid down in [the Convention] shall be null and void
.... ,42 Since the Franklin Mint decision lifts the ceiling on lia-
bility, it may be argued that the Montreal Agreement's $75,000
limitation is void under article 23 because it purports to fix a lower
limit on personal injury liability than that provided for in the
Convention.43
38 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(4), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 22,
137 L.N.T.S. 25. The personal injury liability limitations effectively are eradicated by the
Franklin Mint decision, since the 125,000 gold franc limitation contained in article 22(1)
must be converted by reference to a dollar value of gold. See id.; supra note 4.
3 See supra note 38.
40 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement No. 18,900, approved by Civil Aeronau-
tics Board Order No. E-23680, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Montreal Agreement].
41 Montreal Agreement, supra note 40. The Montreal Agreement of 1966 is a contract
between the United States and a majority of international air carriers providing for a car-
rier's absolute liability up to $75,000. See In re Air Crash Disaster in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F.
Supp. 1114, 1123-24 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982);
1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 12A.01, at 12A-2 to -3 (1981).
42 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 23, 49 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876, at 22, 137
L.N.T.S. 27.
"' See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833, 834 (E.D.N.Y.
1982). In In re Air Crash Disaster, the plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions against
Polskie Linie Lotnicze (LOT), the owner of an aircraft that crashed and caused the death of
all persons on board. Id. at 834. The defendant, LOT, argued that its liability was limited to
$75,000 per passenger under the Montreal Agreement. Id. The plaintiffs contended that the
damage limitation should be calculated, under the Convention, using the free market price
of gold as the appropriate unit of conversion. Id. Since such a calculation would result in a
judgment greater than the $75,000 limitation, the plaintiffs contended that the Montreal
Agreement was void under article 23 of the Convention. Id. The court held that the Mon-
treal Agreement was inapplicable, since the carrier's ticket specifying the terms of the Mon-
treal Agreement did not meet the type-size requirements. Id. at 837-39. The court noted,
however, that were it not for this determination, the Montreal Agreement would have been
applicable, since the last official price of gold was the appropriate unit of conversion. Id. at
839, 844. Conversion by reference to the last official price of gold would result in a judgment
lower than that permitted by the Montreal Agreement, and, therefore, the $75,000 liability
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In sum, it would appear that abolition of the monetary restric-
tions on an air carrier's liability will affect three categories of
claims: actions for damages incurred due to destruction or loss of
or damage to baggage or goods;"' actions for damages for personal
injuries or death when the Montreal Agreement is inapplicable,
but when the plaintiff is able to obtain jurisdiction in the United
States over the defendant airline;45 and actions for personal inju-
ries or death that heretofore would have been subject to the liabil-
ity limitations embodied in the Montreal Agreement.46 So dire an
limitation under the Montreal Agreement would control. Id. at 844. Furthermore, the Policy
Development Division of the CAB noted in a staff memorandum that the Montreal Agree-
ment's $75,000 limitation improperly conflicts with the liability limitations of the Warsaw
Convention whenever the market price of gold exceeds $320 per ounce. See CAB Memoran-
dum, Mar. 18, 1980, supra note 3, at 6. At the time this memorandum was issued, the Policy
Development Division advocated the use of the free market price of gold to compute an
airline's maximum liability. Id. at 1. The Policy Development Division, however, expressed
uncertainty with respect to the future effect on the Montreal Agreement if the free market
price of gold were formally adopted by the CAB, and cautioned that "any order which the
staff drafts be coordinated with the Departments of State and Transportation before it is
sent to the Board for adoption." Id. at 8. In a later memorandum, however, the CAB clari-
fied its position, and now formally advocates use of the last official price of gold as the
proper unit of conversion. See CAB Memorandum, May 20, 1981, supra note 3, at 6. The
plaintiffs' argument in In re Air Crash Disaster is especially applicable to the Franklin
Mint situation because the Convention still imposes liability, but without limitation. See
infra text accompanying note 46.
" See 690 F.2d at 304-05.
45 See generally 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 41, § 11.06, at 11-41 to -51. Article 28 of
the Convention specifies four locations within which personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant may be exercised: the carrier's domicile; its principal place of business; the place where
the ticket was purchased; or the place of destination. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art.
28(1), 49 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876, at 23, 137 L.N.T.S. 27, 29; see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 2, at 522-32; McKenry, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29
J. AIR L. & Com. 205, 208-16 (1963). An example of a situation in which the liability limita-
tion of the Montreal Agreement would be inapplicable, but in which the plaintiff would still
be able to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant airline, would be when the passenger
bought his ticket in England for a flight from London to Paris on an airline that had its
principal place of business in the United States.
46 E.g., Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977);
Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1153 (D.N.M. 1973); Husserl v. Swiss
Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Franklin Mint court specifically stated that its holding was limited "solely to the unen-
forceability of the limits" of the Convention, and that no view was being expressed "as to
the severability of those limits from the rest of the Convention." 690 F.2d at 311 n.27. It
therefore appears that the Convention remains applicable, except for article 22's limitation
on liability. Id.; see Kreindler, Judicial Blows to Warsaw Convention, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1,
1982, at 1, col. 1 (it is unclear whether the balance of the Convention will be enforceable in
the future).
In point of fact, the liability limitation of the Montreal Agreement would have been
controlling in the recent case, In re Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport, Korea, 558 F.
1983]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:592
impact, it is suggested, could have been avoided simply by apply-
ing fundamentals of treaty interpretation.
A MATTER OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
In rendering the Convention's liability limitations unenforce-
able in federal courts,47 the Second Circuit concluded that
"[s]ubstitution of a new [unit of conversion] is a political question,
unfit for judicial resolution. '4 Although the political question doc-
trine is poorly defined,49 it generally enables the judiciary to avoid
deciding an issue that is textually committed by the Constitution
to the control of a coordinate branch of government.5 0 When
presented with a case involving a political question, the Court typi-
cally dismisses the case as nonjusticiable.15 While the doctrine is
Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983), had the court not relied heavily on Franklin Mint for the propo-
sition that the Convention's limitation on liability was unenforceable. See id. at 74.
11 690 F.2d at 311.
48 Id.
49 See Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 599-600 &
600 n.8 (1976). Professor Henkin believes that the political question doctrine is somewhat
muddled because courts have not made clear whether the dismissal of a case as nonjusticia-
ble is based on deference to political branches, lack of jurisdiction of the case under the
Constitution, applicable statutory decisions, or a party's failure to state a sufficient claim for
relief. Id. at 600 n.8; see also Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political Question Doctrine," and
Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1135, 1135-36, 1163 (1970) (there is no such thing as
a political question doctrine, only disparate legal rules largely based on deference to political
branches).
50 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 217 (1962); see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,
998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-22 (1969). In
addition to textual commitment, the Supreme Court has identified other questions that may
be relevant in a political question case, such as whether resolution of the case involves judi-
cially unmanageable standards or whether determination of policy decisions is clearly meant
for nonjudicial discretion. 369 U.S. at 217. The Baker Court identified six elements that
may characterize a political question, one or more of which may be present in a given case:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning ad-
herence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. See generally Jackson, The Political Question Doctrine: Where Does it Stand After
Powell v. McCormack, O'Brien v. Brown and Gilligan v. Morgan, 44 U. COLo. L. REV. 477,
477-80, 500-11 (1973) (discussion of the six Baker "tests").
"I Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969) ("federal courts will not adjudicate
political questions"); Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 956 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d
697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated mem., 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (when a true political question comes
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employed rarely by the courts,"2 it does provide an effective means
of maintaining the separation of powers among the three branches
of government.53
In Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit opined that the case
could not be resolved through examination of "ambiguities which
may be clarified by reference to underlying purpose or with lan-
guage which inadequately mirrors the understood intentions of the
drafters.15 4 The court therefore concluded that the selection of an
alternative unit of conversion actually represented a treaty propo-
sal, negotiation and ratification, all of which are textually commit-
ted by the Constitution to the control of the legislative and execu-
tive branches.5 5 It is suggested, however, that the selection of an
appropriate unit of conversion is not the equivalent of a treaty
proposal, negotiation or ratification, but rather, a matter of treaty
interpretation which falls squarely within the purview of judicial
authority. 6 An examination of several fundamental principles of
before a court, the case should be dismissed as nonjusticiable); see Comment, Treaty Termi-
nation by the President Without Senate or Congressional Approval: The Case of the Tai-
wan Treaty, 33 Sw. L.J. 729, 754 (1979).
52 See Note, Justiciability and Foreign Affairs-The Treaty Termination Power, 46
Mo. L. REv. 164, 171 n.38 (1981).
" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) ("[t]he nonjusticiability of a political ques-
tion is primarily a function of the separation of powers"); see Comment, supra note 51, at
754. The doctrine of separation of powers is based upon the principle that the exercise of
executive, legislative and judicial powers should not rest in one body so that the American
citizenry is protected from the arbitrary action of those in political power. C. POST, THE
SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS 12-13 (1936).
690 F.2d at 311.
"5 Id. The court did not expressly state that the textual commitment argument was
being employed in order to label the issue a political question. Nevertheless, this is the most
reasonable inference that may be drawn since the court merely stated that resolution of the
issue was "plainly a matter to be negotiated by the parties," and that courts must be careful
to "observe the line between treaty interpretation on the one hand and negotiation, proposal
and advice and consent and ratification on the other." Id.
11 The fact that the issue in Franklin Mint could have been resolved by a branch of
government other than the judiciary would not preclude the court from resolving the case
by applying traditional principles of treaty interpretation. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). In Goldwater, the issue was whether a president
may terminate a treaty without Senate approval. 481 F. Supp. at 951. The Supreme Court
held that the issue presented a political question, and remanded the case to the district
court with orders to dismiss the complaint. 444 U.S. at 996. Justice Powell agreed with the
Court's judgment, but premised his concurrence on the ground that the case was not ripe for
decision. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). A political question, however, was not presented
by the case, according to Justice Powell, because, although resolution of the case might be
troublesome, the issue simply required the Court to apply traditional principles of interpre-
tation to the Constitution. Id. at 999 (Powell, J., concurring). It is suggested that Justice
Powell's reasoning may be applied to the Franklin Mint decision. The issue involved in the
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treaty interpretation provides support for this proposition.
A treaty, in essence, is an agreement or contract between two
or more nations or sovereigns. 7 In construing treaties, as with any
other contract, 8 courts will look to the intent of the parties and
the underlying purpose that they sought to achieve.5 Indeed, it is
a basic tenet of treaty law that treaties must be interpreted
broadly in order to effectuate the intentions of the parties.6 0
case could have been resolved either by the signatories to the Convention or by a coordinate
branch of government. Nevertheless, since a treaty is the supreme law of the land, and since
"[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), a court obviously may interpret
a treaty in order to decide an issue, even if another branch of government also could have
resolved the case through international agreement or through domestic legislation. It would
appear, therefore, that the authority to resolve the Convention's "gold problem" resides co-
extensively in all three branches of government. The court's reliance upon the political
question doctrine is misplaced because resolution of the issue in Franklin Mint is textually
committed not only to the executive and legislative branches of government, but to the
judiciary as well.
" Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 316 (1914); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,
474 (1913); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); United States v. Rauscher, 119
U.S. 407, 418 (1886); see A. McNAIR, supra note 33, at 3-6; Comment, supra note 51, at 731-
32. Lord McNair has defined a "treaty" as "a written agreement by which two or more
States or international organizations create or intend to create a relation between them-
selves operating within the sphere of international law." Id. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted). See
generally Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 33, at 686-98 (treaty is a formal instrument
by which two or more nations establish international relations between themselves).
11 Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921); Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331-32
(1912); Board of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, S.A., 307 F.2d 802, 806 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 961 (1963); Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement
Dist. No. 7 v. Hedrick, 226 F.2d 1, 7 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
" Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54-56 (1963); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290
U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. at 439; Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 57
(1903); A. McNAIR, supra note 33, at 380-81. Significantly, treaties are to be construed
"more liberally than private agreements." Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318
U.S. 423, 431 (1943).
80 Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936); Todok v. Union
State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 452 (1930); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Day v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 222 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); Compagnie Financiere de Suez v. United States,
492 F.2d 798, 810-11 (Ct. Cl. 1974); see Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 33, at 937-38
("the function of treaty interpretation is to discover and effectuate the purpose which a
treaty is intended to serve"). See generally A. McNAIR, supra note 33, at 383-92. The Con-
vention, in particular, has been subjected to broad interpretation by the courts. In Glenn v.
Compania Cubana De Aviacion, S.A., 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952), for example, the
treaty was interpreted to apply to a Cuban airliner even though Cuba did not adhere to the
Convention. Id. at 633-34. Additionally, in Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F.
Supp. 801 (N.D. Ga. 1964), afl'd, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905
(1968), the court held that the Convention governs actions arising from accidents on charter
flights. 229 F. Supp. at 809. For other cases requiring interpretation of the Convention, see
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1083-93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Day v.
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Courts are bound to give effect to the stipulations of a treaty and
are not empowered to annul or disregard its provisions unless vio-
lative of the Constitution.6 1 In short, it is the court's "duty to in-
terpret . . and administer [treaties] according to [their] terms. 6 2
Congress alone possesses the authority to abrogate or modify a
treaty through the enactment of a subsequent statute.6 3 A court,
however, may not impute to Congress an intention to abrogate or
modify a treaty unless the subsequent statute either expressly
abandons the treaty or is absolutely incompatible with the terms of
the treaty. 4 The judiciary therefore must sanction performance of
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 34-38 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890
(1976); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per
curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
61 Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853); see In re Air Crash Disaster at
Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (annulment or disregard of a treaty
term constitutes modification, a power solely exercisable by the Senate); King Features Syn-
dicate, Inc., v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 43 F. Supp. 137, 138 (N.D. Tex. 1942) ("[c]ourts
have no right to annul or disregard" any provisions of a treaty upon "notions of equity,
general convenience, or substantial justice"), aff'd, 133 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1943); L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 170 (1975). Henkin has summarized the court's
power with respect to treaties, stating that "[t]he power to terminate a treaty is a political
power: courts do not terminate treaties, though they may interpret political acts or even
political silences to determine whether they implied or intended termination." Id. (footnote
omitted).
62 Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853). An interpretation of a treaty that
will render the treaty wholly or partially inoperative, or that will defeat the object and pur-
poses of the contracting parties, must be rejected. G. DAvIs, THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 246-47 (4th ed. 1915); P. HIGGINS, HALL'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 111, at 390 (8th
ed. 1924); T. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 109, at 186
(1874 & photo. reprint 1981); cf. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 618 (1927) (narrow
construction that would defeat treaty's purpose is to be avoided).
63 See, e.g., Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973); Brandon v. S.S. Denton, 302 F.2d 404, 414 (5th Cir. 1962); Tag v. Rogers, 267
F.2d 664, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 973
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). The
question whether the President of the United States may abrogate a treaty arose in the case
of Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The case, however, was remanded with orders
to dismiss. Id. at 996. A plurality, consisting of Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist, and Stevens, held that the issue whether a President may abrogate a treaty
without congressional approval was essentially a political question, and, therefore, could not
be decided by the Court. Id. at 1002-06. Hence, the question has remained unanswered. See
Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States:
Theory and Practice, 42 MINN. L. REv. 879, 888-89 (1958); Note, supra note 52, at 193-94;
Comment, supra note 51, at 760-61.
See Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S.
138, 160 (1934); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907); United States v. Lee Yen Tai,
185 U.S. 213, 222 (1902); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 380 F. Supp.
452, 459 (D. Mont. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976);
Itzcovitz v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 6, 301 F. Supp. 168, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). It is
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the obligations under a treaty until the treaty has been denounced
by the government of the United States. 5 It is submitted that in
the absence of a clear and unequivocal statement by Congress that
the United States no longer intended to honor the Warsaw Con-
vention, the Franklin Mint court was required to interpret the
treaty in such a manner as to carry out the intention of the parties.
Additionally, article 18 of the Vienna Convention 6 militates in
favor of the argument for employing principles of treaty interpre-
tation to select an alternative unit of conversion. Article 18 pro-
vides that "[a] state is obliged to refrain from acts which would
uncertain whether the Franklin Mint court imputed to Congress an intention to abrogate
the Convention. The court stated that "Congress ...abandoned the unit of conversion
specified by the Convention and did not substitute a new one." 690 F.2d at 311. Further-
more, the court stated that "[s]ince use of a fixed amount of gold as the Convention's unit
was specifically designed to establish a limitation level at a certain value, [repeal of the
official price of gold] must be taken as a statement that the official price no longer reflects
that specified value." Id. at 309. It is suggested that the court may be implying that Con-
gress' repeal of the official price of gold, which became effective in 1978, see supra note 6,
manifests a congressional intent to abrogate the Convention. Indeed, the court observed
that, "[g]iven the lack of an internationally agreed upon standard of conversion, it might be
argued that the Convention has been abrogated." 690 F.2d at 311 n.26. It is ironic that
although the court recognized that "it is not the province of courts to declare treaties abro-
gated," id., it simultaneously annulled article 22 of the Convention.
" See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298 (1933); Charlton v. Kelly, 229
U.S. 447, 473-74 (1913). The force of the proposition that courts must sanction performance
of treaty obligations until the treaty is denounced by the United States government is
strengthened by the converse recognition that the judiciary possesses no power to enforce
provisions of a treaty that the other branches of government choose to disregard. E.g. Bo-
tiler v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 247 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95
(1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 616, 621 (1870).
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter cited as the Vienna Convention]. Although the Vienna Convention
has been signed by the United States, the treaty has not been ratified. Note, supra note 52,
at 192. Nevertheless, the United States recognizes international law as a part of its domestic
law. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900). This is significant because the Vienna Convention has been cited as a statement of
the customary principles of international law. See, e.g., United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d
1252, 1261 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 505 (D.N.J. 1978)
("Most of the Vienna Convention is binding as customary law even upon nations that have
not ratified it, and many of the treaty articles are declaratory of existing international law;
the remaining articles are persuasive as evidence of existing international law"); Garretson,
The Immunities of Representatives of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 68-69 (1966);
Rogoff, The International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty, 32 ME.
L. REV. 263, 287-88 (1980). Indeed, the Vienna Convention, on its face, purports to be a
codification of customary international law with respect to treaties. Vienna Convention,
supra, preamble; see Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 291 (1965-1966) (treaty purporting to be codification of
customary international law is some evidence of the state of that law).
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defeat the object and purpose of a treaty . . . until it shall have
made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty
.... -M7 In 1975, the United States signed Montreal Protocols
Nos. 3 and 4,68 which established a new standard, premised upon
the SDR, for limiting liability under the Convention. 9 Faced with
the elimination of the official price of gold, the signatories to the
protocol clearly intended to preserve the liability limitations of the
Convention."0 Arguably, however, by removing all limitations on
air carrier liability under the Convention, the Second Circuit effec-
tively has defeated the object and purpose of Montreal Protocols
Nos. 3 and 4, and, in so doing, has directly violated article 18 of
the Vienna Convention.71 It is apparent, therefore, that the court's
annulment of the Convention's limits on liability constituted both
an improper modification of the treaty and a direct violation of the
Vienna Convention. The Second Circuit seemingly could have
avoided these unfortunate results and effectuated the intentions of
the signatory nations by interpreting the Convention as sanction-
ing the use of one of the limits on liability proposed by the
litigants. 2
67 Vienna Convention, supra note 66, art. 18(a).
68 I.C.A.O. Docs. Nos. 9147, 9148 (1975), [hereinafter cited as Montreal Protocol], re-
printed in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 985-1001 (2d ed. Supp.
1981).
69 See Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 68, art. II; Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra
note 68, art. VII.
70 See 690 F.2d at 306-08; Martin, supra note 9, at 249.
7, See Martin, supra note 9, at 249; supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
72 It has been well recognized that the gold problem can be resolved through treaty
interpretation. Indeed, the CAB formulated the policy of requiring air carriers to compute
the ceiling limit of liability printed on air tariffs by reference to the last official price of gold,
since that value, in the CAB's view, produced results most nearly consistent with the pur-
pose of the Convention. CAB Memorandum, May 20, 1981, supra note 3, at 6; see Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F. Supp. at 1289. Although the CAB recog-
nizes that use of the last official price of gold is tantamount to "engaging in a legal fiction"
since that standard no longer exists, it is significant that their decision was based upon the
conclusion that an appropriate method of conversion was necessary to effectuate the Con-
vention's purpose and to prevent the treaty from becoming a nullity in the United States.
See CAB Memorandum, May 20, 1981, supra note 3, at 6. Other federal courts that have
dealt with the gold problem have recognized and expressed the court's duty to interpret the
Convention in order to find an appropriate method of translating judgments into United
States currency. See 535 F. Supp. at 842-43; 531 F. Supp. at 352-53; 525 F. Supp. at 1289. In
Boehringer, for example, the court recognized that lack of precedent required "a close read-
ing and interpretation of Article 22 of the Convention," in order to resolve the gold problem.
531 F. Supp. at 352. Similarly, in In re Air Crash Disaster, the court experienced difficulty
in interpreting the intention of the Convention's drafters so as to select an appropriate
method of conversion. 535 F. Supp. at 843-44. Though the merits of the conclusions reached
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Despite the United States Senate's recent failure to ratify
Montreal Protocols Nos. 3 and 4,73 an action that would have
solved the Convention's gold standard dilemma,74 the Warsaw
Convention has not been denounced by the United States.7 5 Choice
of an appropriate unit of account, therefore, remains incumbent
upon the courts in order to effectuate the intentions of the
signatories.
SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE UNIT OF ACCOUNT THROUGH TREATY
INTERPRETATION-THE SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHT
Gold was selected by the signatories to the Convention as the
appropriate unit of conversion since, at the time of the treaty's
signing in 1929, gold was the common denominator of international
transactions.78 Indeed, it enabled the framers to effectuate the
treaty's express purpose of creating an internationally uniform
ceiling on liability.77 It is significant to note, therefore, that gold
merely represented a means by which to achieve the Convention's
purpose, and was not, in and of itself, an essential ingredient of the
treaty.7 1 This is evidenced by the subsequent signing of Montreal
Protocols Nos. 3 and 4, documents which manifest the signatories'
continued intention to limit liability, but which expressly reject the
use of gold as the appropriate unit of conversion.7 9 Of the four
standards for limiting liability proposed by the litigants in Frank-
lin Mint, it is submitted that utilization of the SDR would best
provide a uniform ceiling on the liability of air carriers.
Adopted in 1975 by the IMF, the SDR presently occupies
gold's former status as a universal exchange value,80 and is, in es-
by these courts may be questionable, it is suggested that the fact that the gold problem was
recognized as one of treaty interpretation is significant.
73 See 129 CONG. REC. S2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983); Shribman, Air Liability Treaty
Rejected by Senate, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1983, at D6, col. 5; Senate Rejects Treaty Raising
Airline Liability, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
15 See TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB.
No. 9285, TREATIES IN FORCE 207-10 (1982).
" See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
7 See supra note 3.
"' See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text; see also P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 652
(10th ed. 1979) ("[tlhere is nothing sacred about gold. Silver, platinum, lead, or, for that
matter paper napkins would do, provided they had convenience for exchange, could not be
falsified, and were enough limited in supply to keep the price level from soaring").
' See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
SO See supra note 6.
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sence, "paper gold."81 The SDR provides a stable medium of ex-
change that remains relatively unaffected by the actions of any
particular government.8 2 Accordingly, it is suggested that a stan-
dard of liability limitation premised upon the SDR best effectuates
the intentions of the signatory nations.8 3 Indeed, it can be argued
that had the SDR existed at the time of the Convention's forma-
tion, the signatories would have employed it as the appropriate
unit of account.8 4
A fundamental concept of treaty interpretation-examination
of the subsequent conduct of the parties-provides additional im-
petus for the selection of the SDR. An essential provision of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifically provides
that, in addition to the actual terms of a treaty, "any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
81 See Heller, supra note 3, at 96.
22 See 690 F.2d at 307; Fitzgerald, The Four Montreal Protocols to Amend the Warsaw
Convention Regime Governing International Carriage by Air, 42 J. Am L. & CoM. 273, 348
(1976). One reason cited by the Franklin Mint court for rejecting the SDR as a unit of
conversion was that the SDR is subject to modification or elimination by the IMF. 690 F.2d
at 310. The court stated that it lacked authority to adopt a unit of conversion that was
"variable at the whim of an international body distinct from the parties to the Cohvention."
Id. at 311. It is interesting to note, however, that the value of gold was also subject to
modification or elimination by the IMF. See Second Amendment to the International Mone-
tary Fund Articles of Agreement, Apr. 30, 1976, art. V, § 12(c)-(g); art. VIII, § 7, 29 U.S.T.
2203, 2218, 2226, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
83 See Martin, supra note 9, at 249. Comparison of the SDR with the other proposed
standards of liability limitation manifests the SDR's superiority. Employment of the last
official price of gold would be illogical because it represents a value that specifically has
been rejected by Congress. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660
(1976). Since it is a value that no longer exists, any decision to utilize the last official price
of gold would be arbitrary. See CAB Memorandum, May 20, 1981, supra note 3, at 6. Al-
though the last official price of gold would create uniformity of liability because it repre-
sents a fixed value of gold, it is suggested that the SDR's availability makes resort to an
arbitrary value unnecessary. The free market price of gold is the least acceptable alternative
because, by its very nature, it contravenes the Convention's purpose of providing consistent
judgments throughout the member nations. Id. at 5. Significantly, the Boehringer court,
while adopting the free market price of gold, admitted its awareness that "the liability limi-
tations ... may be unrealistically high. . . ." 531 F. Supp. at 353 n.47. The fluctuations of
the price of gold from approximately $160 per ounce in 1974 to over $800 per ounce by the
end of the 1970's is graphic evidence of the mercurial, and hence unsuitable nature of this
measure of conversion. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 3, § 6.5, at 7-169. Finally, the current
value of the French franc is flawed because it represents, as does the free market price of
gold, precisely what the framers were trying to avoid-a currency subject to the fluctuations
of a single nation. See 690 F.2d at 310; supra note 82.
See In re Air Crash Disaster, 535 F. Supp. at 840-41 (defendant aircraft owner ar-
gued that gold was appropriate unit of conversion when Convention was drafted in 1929
because gold was common denominator of currency conversion, and that gold of today is
SDR).
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treaty or the application of its provisions," must be considered for
purposes of treaty interpretation."5 Accordingly, the Second Circuit
has observed that a treaty cannot be viewed as "frozen in the year
of its creation,"86 and found the subsequent actions and agree-
ments of the signatories highly revelatory of the appropriate con-
struction to be placed upon a particular provision of the Conven-
tion.87 Nevertheless, the Franklin Mint court declined to endorse
11 Vienna Convention, supra note 66, art. 31(3)(a); see supra note 66.
86 Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 890 (1976). In Day, the court was called upon to decide whether passengers who suf-
fered injuries and death as a result of a terrorist attack while waiting to board an interna-
tional flight were "embarking" within the meaning of article 17 of the Convention. Id. at 32
& n.4. Construing the Convention, the court stated that a treaty should be interpreted in a
manner that is consistent with the expectations of the parties. Id. at 35. Since the parties'
expectations vary over the course of time, the court stated that "[c]onditions and new meth-
ods may arise not present at the precise moment of drafting. For a court to view a treaty as
frozen in the year of its creation is scarcely more justifiable than to regard the Constitu-
tional clock as forever stopped in 1787." Id. The court found that the plaintiffs were "em-
barking" within the meaning of the Convention, and thus held TWA liable under the terms
of the treaty. Id. at 32. In reaching this determination, the court stated that its decision
furthered the intent of the Convention's drafters since the "Warsaw delegates knew that, in
the years to come, civil aviation would change in ways that they could not foresee." Id. at
38. The court concluded that the framers desired to create a system of air law that would be
flexible enough to accommodate unforeseen changes. Id. It is suggested that the Day ration-
ale may be analogized to the argument for adopting the SDR as the basic unit of account
under the Convention. The fact that the original framers might not have foreseen the even-
tual changes in the world's economy when they chose gold as the standard of conversion
does not necessitate the conclusion that the Convention is so inflexible that it cannot be
adapted to the modern economy. See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 360 F.2d 804, 812 (2d Cir.
1966) (treaty language initially chosen may, because of changed conditions, imperfectly
manifest the treaty's purpose, thus requiring courts to adopt a practical rather than a literal
reading in order to effectuate such purpose); see also Harvard Draft Convention, supra note
33, at 970 (interpreter's task is to render a construction that will effectuate treaty's purpose
under present conditions).
81 528 F.2d at 35-37; see Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W.
Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 158 (1934); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933);
Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp.
702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973); G. DAVIS, supra
note 62, at 247; T. WOOLSEY, supra note 62, § 109, at 186; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 147(1)(f), at 451 (1965); Harvard Draft
Convention, supra note 33, at 937, 966-70. In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp.
702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit
affirmed a district court decision that imposed liability upon the defendant airline for inju-
ries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the aircraft's hijacking. 351 F. Supp. at
707. The district court reasoned that although a hijacking was probably not within the con-
templation of the framers when the Convention was drafted, id. at 706, the subsequent con-
duct of the parties as embodied in the Montreal Agreement indicated that "sabotage" of an
aircraft was meant to be compensable since it was within the meaning of the article 17 term
"accident," id. at 706. Significantly, the court stated that although the Montreal Agreement
was not binding upon the judiciary as a treaty, it could be used as evidence of the subse-
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the SDR despite the ample subsequent conduct of the parties mili-
tating in favor of its adoption.
Confronted with the difficulty of applying the article 22 liabil-
ity limitations in the wake of the demonetization of gold, the Con-
vention members drafted Montreal Protocols Nos. 3 and 4,88
amendments to the Convention that expressed an air carrier's lia-
bility in terms of a specified number of SDR's.s9 Additionally, sev-
eral signatories have adopted the SDR, either legislatively or judi-
cially, for purposes of judgment conversions." The United States'
quent conduct of the parties for purposes of interpretation. Id. at 707.
In Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
890 (1976), the court was asked to resolve the issue whether passengers, who were injured or
killed as a result of a terrorist attack on an Athens airport, were "embarking" within the
meaning of article 17 of the Convention. 528 F.2d at 32. In reaching the conclusion that the
passengers, though only waiting in line at the departure gate, were, in fact, "embarking"
within the meaning of article 17, id. at 32, the Day court looked to the increased liability
limitations set forth in the Montreal Agreement and the unratified Guatamala City Protocol
as evidence that the subsequent conduct of the parties was indicative of a desire to increase
the protection afforded to passengers, id. at 36 & n.15. Additionally, the court reasoned that
its holding furthered the intentions of the signatories since it was their intention to con-
struct a system of air law that was flexible enough to accommodate changes in circum-
stances over the course of time. Id. at 38.
Finally, in Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977), the
court was presented with the question whether airline employees were entitled to assert the
liability limitations of the Convention as a defense to wrongful death actions. 555 F.2d at
1081. The court held that the Convention's liability limitation provisions did apply to suits
against airline employees, since a contrary determination would permit a plaintiff to recover
from the carrier, through its employees, damages in excess of the article 22 limitation. Id. at
1089. In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to the Hague Protocol to Amend the Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept.
28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter cited as Hague Protocol], an amendment to the
Convention that specifically extended the article 22 liability limitation to airline employees,
see Hague Protocol, supra, art. XIV, at 383, as evidence that the Convention's ceiling on
liability was meant to embrace suits against airline employees. See 555 F.2d at 1084-88.
Significantly, the court rejected the argument that the United States' failure to ratify the
Hague Protocol was a sufficient basis upon which to exclude the amendment from consider-
ation. Id. at 1086.
Is See 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 41, § 12B.02[10], at 12B-28 to -29; A. LOWENFELD,
supra note 3, § 6.5, at 7-171; Fitzgerald, supra note 82, at 323-30. The Montreal Conference,
attended by 66 nations, convened mainly in order to revise the cargo provisions of the Con-
vention. Fitzgerald, supra note 82, at 348. Ultimately, however, it drafted four protocols, the
third of which, Montreal Protocol No. 3, altered the Convention's unit of conversion from
the French gold franc to the SDR. Id. at 330. Significantly, the United States provided the
impetus for the adoption of the SDR. See id. at 323-27.
19 Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 68, art. II; Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note
68, art. VII. Montreal Protocol No. 3 provides for a liability limitation of 100,000 SDR's
($117,000) for passenger injury or death and 17 SDR's ($20) per kilogram of damaged or lost
cargo. Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 68, art. H.
90 As noted by the Franklin Mint court, four members of the Convention, Great Brit-
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intention to replace gold with the SDR, as that intention is embod-
ied in Montreal Protocols Nos. 3 and 4 may be asserted notwith-
standing the Senate's failure to ratify the protocols. 1 Although
Montreal Protocols Nos. 3 and 4 did not receive the two-thirds
Senate majority required for ratification,92 the protocols did re-
ceive a simple majority, falling only twelve votes short of ratifica-
tion. 3 Additionally, some of the Senators who voted against ratifi-
cation did so for reasons other than dissatisfaction with imposing
liability limitations.9 4 Coupled with majority support of limited lia-
bility in the Senate are several other factors that indicate the
ain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Italy, adopted the SDR for purposes of the Convention
either by judicial decision or by statute. See 690 F.2d at 308 & nn. 14-15.
91 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. In Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1086, the
Second Circuit reversed the district court holding that the liability limitations of the Con-
vention did not apply to airline employees. Id. at 1081. In reaching its conclusion, the dis-
trict court relied on the Senate's failure to ratify the Hague Protocol, an amendment to the
Convention which contained a provision extending the Convention's limited liability to an
airline's agents and employees, as evidence that limited liability was not meant to so extend.
Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1977). The Second Circuit viewed the lower court's reliance on the
Senate's failure to ratify the Hague Protocol as "misplaced, since the refusal to ratify the
Protocol was due to the United States' dissatisfaction with an entirely different aspect of
the Protocol-its failure to provide a sufficient increase in the liability limits-rather than
to its express application of these limits to a carrier's employees." 555 F.2d at 1086. It is
submitted that the Second Circuit's reasoning in Reed illustrates that the Senate's failure to
ratify Montreal Protocol Nos. 3 and 4 is not necessarily inimical to or inconsistent with
judicial selection of the SDR. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
92 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur . . ").
93 See Ex. B, 95-1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983).
Fifty Senators voted in favor of ratification, 42 against; 7 Senators did not vote, with one
answering "present." Id.
See 129 CONG. REc. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statements of Sen. Lautenberg
and Sen. Biden). Part of Senator Lautenberg's opposition to the protocols stemmed from his
belief that the protocols did not reduce the high costs of litigation borne by plaintiffs and
defendants, a goal, the Senator maintained, the protocols were designed to achieve. Id. Sen-
ator Lautenberg's primary opposition to the protocols, however, was based not on the impo-
sition of a limit on liability, but on his perception that the limit selected was arbitrary and
bore "little or no relation to the actual damages of each injured person, or the type of con-
duct of the airline." Id. Senator Biden was opposed to ratification primarily because the
protocols would remove the wilful misconduct exception of the Convention that exposes an
airline to unlimited liability. Id.; see Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1) (carrier
not permitted to assert Convention's limitation of liability as defense when damage is
caused by carrier's wilful misconduct). Senator Biden believed that if the wilful misconduct
exception were removed, in effect imposing liability without fault, incidents of airline mis-
conduct might go unexamined, thus "reduc[ing] the incentive for airlines to be safety con-
scious." 129 CONG. REc. S2278 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983) (statement of Sen. Biden).
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United States' intention to adopt the liability limitations con-
tained in the protocols: the Executive Branch of the United States
and the Departments of State and Transportation support the pro-
tocols,"5 the United States itself proposed incorporation of the
SDR into the Convention's formula for judgment conversion,"' and
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted in favor of ratifica-
tion sixteen to one.97
Clearly, the protocols and the actions of these signatories
manifest an intention on the part of the member nations to elimi-
nate gold as a unit of conversion and to substitute a standard of
liability premised upon the SDR.9 It thus is suggested that in
eradicating all limitations on liability under the Convention, the
Franklin Mint court has neglected to give effect to the signatories'
intentions, has failed to consider the conduct of the parties subse-
quent to the signing of the Convention, and has improperly nulli-
fied a provision of a treaty to which the United States is a party.
The more prudent course of action, it is submitted, would have
been to replace the Poincar6 franc with the SDR as the basic unit
of account under the Convention.
One question, however, remains. Because, unlike gold, the
SDR cannot be used to convert the Convention's existing unit of
account, 9  the Poincar6 franc, into any national currency, the court
must establish the quantity of SDR's that will comprise the new
standard. While at first glance this may appear to be treaty modifi-
cation, a closer inspection demonstrates that it is simply a matter
of treaty interpretation. Montreal Protocol No. 3 establishes that
an air carrier's liability may not exceed 17 SDR's for damage to
cargo and 100,000 SDR's for personal injuries. 100 Rather than judi-
cial imposition of an arbitrary and speculative number of SDR's,
adoption of these specific limitations can be premised upon the ap-
plication of traditional principles of treaty interpretation. 101 As a
,5 129 CONG. REC. S2237-38 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (letters of Warren Christopher,
George P. Schultz and James A. Baker HI).
" Fitzgerald, supra note 82, at 325.
" 129 CONG. REc. S2237 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (letter of Gerald R. Ford).
98 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
9" See supra note 9.
100 Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 68, art. H.
101 See Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d at 35-36. The Day court, in com-
menting upon the use of subsequent conduct as a vehicle to discern the intent of the parties,
stated that such an examination is not an imposition of the court's values upon the parties,
but merely represented the court's "respect [for,] and implement[ation] of the goals and
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document embodying the subsequent actions of the parties to the
Warsaw treaty, Montreal Protocol No. 3 provides authority for se-
lecting the SDR standards specified therein as the proper limita-
tions on liability. 10 2
CONCLUSION
In rendering the liability limitation for cargo damage or loss
unenforceable, the Franklin Mint court arguably has modified a
treaty of the United States. Although the elimination of the official
price of gold posed a serious dilemma, the Second Circuit's appar-
ent infringement upon the powers of the executive and legislative
branches of government was neither warranted nor necessary. By
relying upon traditional principles of treaty interpretation, the
court could have formulated a new standard of liability based upon
the SDR. It is urged that, in the future, courts embrace the con-
cept of the SDR so as to enable the United States to continue its
adherence to the Warsaw treaty until the Convention is amended
further to include a workable standard of liability.
Kenneth J. Vianale
intentions of the parties." Id. at 36 n.13.
102 See Vienna Convention, supra note 66, art. 31(3)(a), at 692. For a discussion of cases
in which courts have examined the signatories' subsequent agreements as a method of treaty
interpretation, see supra note 87.
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